

# **Total Force Alternatives to ARI**

**Presented by:  
AGAUS**

***BLUF...***

***The Adjutants General believe there are viable Total Force solutions that provide more depth and less risk than ARI***

***ARI is not a Total Force solution***

**There have been several Army Aviation transformations (i.e., 1993, 2000, 2004) that were fully transparent, collaborative and in which all components had a voice**

**Unlike 1993, 2000 and 2004, ARI is a single solution discussion from the Active Army. When NGB was invited to participate, decisions had essentially already been made and viable alternatives were not considered**

**Adjutants General were not involved in the development of ARI and were only briefed when it was completed in the Fall of 2013**

## **The ARI process included numerous flawed assumptions**

- **ARNG ARBs were not available**

False – ARNG ARBs responded to every deployment request

- **UH-72 is a cost-effective trainer, over the life of the aircraft**

This is yet to be proven and top-level analysis shows otherwise. ARI did not include evidence of a Cost-Benefit Analysis.

- **The Army/Nation will be in a period of persistent conflict (ISC-B scenario, RAND)**

This is yet to be proven and current politics appear to favor smaller limited deployments.

- **ARNG is fixed to a 1:5 ARFORGEN model**

False – As per CNGB and TAG agreement, “we’re all in” for contingency and emergency operations. Also, OIF/OEF deployment history shows routine deployments of ARNG Attack and Assault helicopter companies near 1:4, and Medevac and Cargo companies near 1:3. Army modernization schedules (AH-64A to AH-64D) prevented greater use of ARNG AH-64s.

- **ARBs have no DOMOPS use**

False – AH-64s have a role in DOMOPs and the unit C2, personnel, and other MTOE equipment are incredibly valuable.

- **ARNG has insufficient UH-60s for DOMOPS**

False – There has never been an instance of insufficient lift - EMACs work when requirements exceed a state’s capacity.

- **ARNG ARBs take too long to spin up for mobilization**

False – The Guard spin-up time is proportional to pre-mob funding levels and is controlled by 1<sup>st</sup> Army. Using the USAF as an example, ANG units are funded to and meet the same spin-up timeline (72 hours) as the active Air Force.

- **The ARNG can’t sustain proficiency in the complex Attack-Recon mission**

False – ARNG ARBs performed superbly in OEF/OIF and prior to 9/11 trained to standard for full spectrum operations to include deep attack.

- **We cannot underequip the AC**

False – We’ve done it before (equipped AC ARBs at 21 of 24 AH-64s), with no adverse consequences. HQDA is prepared to under-equip Grey Eagle companies and Shadow Platoons. Additionally, the 24 aircraft configuration was based on the threat of former Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiments.

## **ARIs impact on the Warfighter**

### **ARI redefines the role of the ARNG**

- The Constitutional, statutory and historical role of the ARNG is the Army's Combat Reserve
- ARI relegates ARNG Aviation to Domestic Operations or Combat Support
- ARI establishes a "slippery slope" – ARI logic could be used on tanks, Strykers, artillery, etc during the next budget crisis

### **ARI relies on an unsustainable Deploy to Dwell Ratio for ARBs/ARs**

- Active Army Soldiers will have limited time for professional development, their families, etc.
- In the 1990s there was a similar issue and HQDA was unable to retain Apache pilots without a sizeable bonus
- Dwell rates were established for OIF/OEF and may not be relevant for the next conflict(s)

### **ARI dis-incentivises the Army from developing/acquiring a true aero-scout**

- The Army still has the requirement for a scout helicopter and the AH-64 was not designed to be a scout
- There are commercial off the shelf (COTS) aircraft that could fill this role at a significant cost savings below AH-64s

### **ARI assumes unacceptable strategic risk to the Warfighter**

- Reduces 37 Apache Bns and Kiowa Warrior Sqdns to 20 Apache Bns (46% loss in Attack/Recon capability)
- No Attack/Recon Bns to cover unknown requirements – modeling shows all ARBs are committed to known requirements
- Potential decrease of over 50% of dedicated USAF and USA ground-attack aircraft

Aircraft	FY 12	FY 19
OH-58D	368*	0
AH-64	810*	726
A-10	348	0
Total	1516	726

\* Army Acquisition Objective

ARI reduces direct ground  
attack aircraft by **38%**

ARI and proposed USAF A-10  
cuts reduce direct ground  
attack aircraft by **52%**

## **ARI Impacts to the Total Force**

### **ARI moves the most expensive Aviation units to the most expensive component**

- ARB annual operating costs: AC: ~\$70M; ARNG: ~\$30M

### **ARI provides no means for the ARNG to evolve to a manned-unmanned culture**

- AC Aviation has organic UAS; ARNG Aviation does not and will not under ARI

### **ARI moves the top level of Aviation modularity from the Brigade to the Battalion**


- ARNG Brigades and Brigade HQs no longer have similar capabilities and lose relevance

### **ARI may violate existing laws and directives**

- Secretary of the Army Memorandum establishing Total Force Policy
- DoD Directive 1200.17, Title 32 U.S.C., 2015 National Defense Authorization Act  
'manage RC as operational force, providing strategic depth through RC, and integrating RC across the full spectrum of missions'

### **ARI further unbalances Army Aviation**

- The attack/recon fleet balance no longer mirrors that of the remainder of Army Aviation



## **ARI – viable options exist**

### **Option #1 (Reduce the number of AH-64s in ARSs from 24 to 18 – based on supporting data from California)**

- Provides 26 ARBs/ARSs for 13 CABs: 10 AC CABs and 3 ARNG CABs
- Equips 20 AC ARBs/ARSs and 6 ARNG ARBs/ARSs for a total of 546 operational AH-64s
- ARSs equipped with 18 aircraft (3 platoons of 6) and 3 TUAS platoons. ARBs retain 24 AH-64s
- Meets ARI requirements for AC CABs, Korea, flight school, and test; provides 37 spares (ARI asks for 107 spares)
- Likely to have limited costing impact compared to ARI, provides 66 more operational AH-64s over ARI
- Improves deploy to dwell for AC ARBs/ARSs
- Does not require the purchase of any new AH-64s

### **Option #2 (Equip ARSs with a COTS available scout aircraft, this option uses the AH/MH-6 as an example)**

- Provides 26 ARBs/ARSs for 13 CABs; 10 AC CABs and 3 ARNG CABs
- Equips 20 AC ARBs/ARSs and 6 ARNG ARBs/ARSs for a total of 312 AH-64s and 234 AH-6s (546 Aircraft)
- Equips ARSs with 18 AH-6 aircraft – would require the purchase of 234 AH/MH-6s plus training aircraft
- Cost for 234 AH-6 approximately \$1.5B (est) Provides all new aircraft at a greatly reduced operating cost
- Provides the Army a lower-cost, C-130 deployable, proven quick reaction recon/close combat aircraft
- Maintains the scout mission at a low cost until next generation scout helicopter is developed and fielded
- Likely to increase costs initially due to aircraft purchases, but should be less costly due to lower operational costs, provides 66 more operational attack/recon aircraft over ARI

## **Conclusion**

- ***This is not a decision between ARI or the National Guard Proposal***
- ***Its about what is best for the Total Force and the Nation***
- ***The COAs highlighted represent some of the numerous compromise options available to the Total Force to increase depth, reduce risk and support strategic objectives better than ARI does***